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Relative Judgment and Knowledge of the Category Structure
Neil Stewart and William J. Matthews
University of Warwick
For evenly spaced stimuli, a purely relative judgment account of unidimensional categorization
performance is trivial—all that is required is knowledge of the size of stimulus difference cor-
responding to the width of a category. For unevenly spaced stimuli, long-term knowledge of
the category structure is required. We argue that such knowledge does not necessitate a direct,
absolute mapping between (representations of) stimulus magnitudes and category labels. We
show that Stewart, Brown, and Chater’s (2005) relative judgment model can account for data
from absolute identification experiments with uneven stimulus spacing.
Models of the identification and categorization of simple
perceptual stimuli have been divided into two classes. First,
there are those models in which there is a direct mapping
between stimulus magnitudes or regions of stimulus space
and category labels (Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Durlach &
Braida, 1969; Kent & Lamberts, 2005; Lacouture & Marley,
2004; Luce, Green, & Weber, 1976; Marley & Cook, 1986;
Nosofsky, 1986, 1997; Petrov & Anderson, 2005). Second,
there are relative judgments models in which there is no long-
term mapping between stimulus magnitudes or regions of
stimulus space and category labels. These mappings are as-
sumed to be unavailable or, at least, unused. Instead, in rela-
tive judgment models, judgments are made with reference to
recently encountered stimuli and category labels (Holland &
Lockhead, 1968; Laming, 1984, 1997; Stewart, 2007; Stew-
art & Brown, 2004; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2002; Stewart
et al., 2005). Most recently, the SAMBA model integrates
these two accounts (Brown, Marley, Donkin, & Heathcote,
2008).
Recently Brown, Marley, Dodds, and Heathcote (in press)
discussed how relative judgment might account for data from
category structures where stimuli are unevenly spaced. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the three spacings of stimuli along a sin-
gle continuum taken from their experiment. The experi-
ment was absolute identification, in which stimuli are pre-
sented one at a time (with replacement) and participants
are required to identify each stimulus with a unique label.
Trial-by-trial feedback of the correct answer is provided. A
Neil Stewart and William J. Matthews, Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. Email:
neil.stewart@warwick.ac.uk
This research was supported by ESRC grants RES-062-23-0952,
RES-000-22-2459, and RES-000-23-1372. We are grateful to Scott
Brown and an anonymous reviewer for their comments, and to
James S. Adelman, Gordon D. A. Brown, Koen Lamberts, and
Stian Reimers for discussion. Source code for the relative judgment
model is available from Stewart’s web page.
Stewart, N., & Matthews, W. J. (2009). Relative judgment and
knowledge of the category structure. Psychonomic Bulletin & Re-
view, 16, 594–599.
Figure 1. The three category structures used by Brown et al. (in
press). Numbers in quotation marks are category labels.
relative-judgment account for the Even-Spread Condition is
quite straightforward. All that is required is knowledge of
the exchange rate between stimulus units and response units.
Thus, if one has learned that 3 dB equals one response cat-
egory then, given the category of the previous stimulus and
a perception of the difference between current and previous
stimuli, one can determine the category of the current stimu-
lus (see Holland & Lockhead, 1968, for a relative judgment
account of this sort).
When stimuli are not evenly spaced along the continuum,
as in the Low- and High-Spread Conditions, relative judg-
ment is not quite so straightforward. Now, as Brown et al.
(in press) describe, the above strategy will not work. There
is no simple exchange rate between stimulus differences and
response scale differences because the size of stimulus dif-
ference required for a change in response category varies as
a function of the previous stimulus.
In the remainder of this article, we describe a look-up table
model of relative judgment. We show that, if redundancy in
the category structure representation is exploited, the look-up
table representation is equivalent to the Stewart et al. (2005)
relative judgment model (known by the acronym RJM). Fi-
nally, we demonstrate that this model can account for the
uneven spacing data from Brown et al. (in press).
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Figure 2. A: A look-up table relative judgment model. B: The
same look-up table aligned by category boundaries rather than by
zero difference. C: The same information represented on a single
response scale. Digits in quotes on the left hand side of each re-
gion refer to the linguistic category label for that region. Dashed
lines denote the zero points and correspond to z“1”, z“2”, and z“3”.
The horizontal axis represents the difference between consecutive
stimuli and corresponds to the D
C
n,n−1
λ term in Equation 3.
A Look-Up Table Model of
Relative Judgment
Consider a purely relative judgment model, in which one
constructs a look-up table for the current response as a func-
tion of (a) the previous feedback linguistic label and (b)
the difference between the previous stimulus and the current
stimulus. Figure 2A shows an example of such a look-up
table. For example, when the previous feedback is “2”, then
small differences will lead to responding “2”, larger nega-
tive differences will lead to responding “1”, and larger pos-
itive differences will lead to responding “3”. This look-up
table might be learned over the initial trials of the experi-
ment. If stimulus differences are perceived and remembered
accurately, then performance could be perfectly accurate.
The look-up table model could be considered as an exem-
plar model in which the exemplars are {previous feedback
label, stimulus difference} pairs and the exemplars are stored
with their category labels. Rather than pursue this possibil-
ity, we show below that Stewart et al.’s (2005) RJM can be
interpreted within this look-up table framework.
Exploiting Redundancy in the
Look-Up Table
Because stimuli are drawn from a single continuum with
a static category structure (i.e., there is a consistent mapping
between stimuli and feedback in the experiment), there is re-
dundancy in the look-up table representation. Across the dif-
ferent levels of the previous feedback label, a given category
must have the same width. For example, in Figure 2A, the
width of Category “2” must be the same, irrespective of the
previous feedback. Figure 2B shows the same table aligned
by the start and end of the Category “2” regions. The dashed
lines represent the zero points, but they are now no longer
aligned with one another. These zero points are essentially
a record, for different possible previous feedback labels, of
where to begin the look up of stimulus differences.
In general, the look-up table represents the location of cat-
egory boundaries on a stimulus difference scale relative to
the location of a zero difference (Figure 2A). Alternatively,
one can represent the location of the zero points relative to
the category boundaries (Figure 2B). In both interpretations
the same information—the relative locations of criteria and
zero points—is represented. Figure 2C shows these three
points represented on a single scale. Note how each zero
point is associated with a linguistic feedback label. Again,
the information represented is the same as in Figures 2A and
2B. This scale is the internal response scale from the Stewart
et al. (2005) RJM, as we describe below.
Equivalence to the Stewart et al.
(2005) RJM
Here we briefly summarize the RJM to make the look-up
table interpretation clear (but see Stewart et al., 2005, for de-
tails). In the RJM, perceptual representations of the absolute
magnitudes of stimuli are unavailable or unused. Instead,
the elemental perceptual unit is the difference between the
current stimulus and the previous stimulus, Dn,n−1 (Equa-
tion 1). (Of course, there must be some peripheral repre-
sentation of absolute stimulus magnitude to allow the differ-
ences between consecutive stimuli to be apprehended over
silent or blank intervals between stimuli, but it is only stimu-
lus differences that are utilized in identification.)






The units of Dn,n−1 are arbitrary, and depend on the sensory
constant A. Xn/Xn−1 is the ratio of the physical magnitudes
of the current and previous stimuli. Consecutive differences
are assumed to be confused with one another, producing a







where α0 = 1 and αi > αi+1 for all i > 0.
The stimulus difference is used to derive a distribution for
the estimate of the magnitude of the current stimulus on an
internal response scale, Rn.
Rn = zn−1 +
DCn,n−1
λ +ρL (3)
zn−1 is the location on the internal response scale of the
zero point associated with Fn−1 (the linguistic category label
from the previous trial). The ρL term represents noise. L is
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the Laplace distribution, with mean 0 and scale parameter σ
(Stewart, 2007). ρ is the range of available responses given
the previous feedback and the difference between the current
or previous stimuli (see Stewart et al., 2005, for details). λ is
the size of stimulus difference corresponding to an (arbitrary)
unit on the internal response scale.
Note here that we have changed the notation from the
2005 version to make clear the distinction between the cat-
egory label and the associated location on the internal re-
sponse scale. To see why the distinction is crucial, consider
an absolute identification experiment in which stimulus la-
bels are not integers but are instead nonsense words (e.g.,
“deg” for Stimulus 1, “rop” for Stimulus 2, ...). The partic-
ipant must learn the locations on the internal response scale
associated with each nonsense word. In the 2005 version of
Equation 3, Fn−1 appeared in place of zn−1. Because the units
of the internal response scale are arbitrary, using the integers
to represent the locations associated with the feedback la-
bels “1”, “2”, ... on the internal response scale is acceptable
for evenly-spaced stimuli. For nonsense words this makes
no sense: One cannot add a stimulus difference to “rop”;
“rop” must be converted into some magnitude on the inter-
nal response scale. The 2005 simplification of using integers
for the internal magnitudes is further confusing because it
suggests that the internal response scale actually is the set
of integers used as feedback labels, when in fact the units
of the internal response scale are arbitrary. And the 2005
simplification is inadequate because it does not distinguish
between the verbal labels paired with stimuli by the experi-
menter and the representations of the points on the internal
response scale associated with those labels by the participant.
In making the substitution of zn−1 for Fn−1 here, the workings
of the model are clarified but the predictions of the model are
unchanged.
A core assumption of the model is that a stimulus cannot
give rise to activation on the internal response scale except
via the relative judgment process in Equation 3. That is,
there is no mapping between raw representations of stimulus
magnitudes and locations on the internal response scale (cf.
Brown et al.’s, 2008, assumption that their rehearsal scale is
not addressable with category label tags).
The probability of responding with each category label is
given by dividing the internal response scale with optimally
located criteria, x“1”−“2”,x“2”−“3”, ...,x“N−1”−“N” where there
are N categories. Subscripts refer to the category labels of the
regions a criterion divides. In the 2005 treatment of evenly-
spaced stimuli, Stewart et al. used a James-Stein estimator
to approximate the optimal locations. For unevenly-spaced
stimuli, criteria are assumed to be placed to maximize ac-
curacy. One interpretation of the division of the internal re-
sponse scale has Rn representing a distributed pattern of acti-
vation across a population of neurons, with the x“i”−“i+1” cri-
teria representing the limits of the receptive fields of neurons
summing activation in the population.
Figure 2C represents the internal response scale in the
RJM. The dashed lines represent zero points z“1”, z“2”, and
z“3” associated with each category label. For example, if
Fn−1 = “3” then zn−1 = z“3”. The category boundaries repre-
sent the criteria x“1”−“2” and x“2”−“3”. The RJM representa-
tion of the category structure contains the same information
as the look-up table model.
We think it is uncontroversial to claim that judgment based
on the look-up table is relative and not absolute. Partition-
ing the table up into labeled response regions does not imply
some direct link between response category labels and raw
stimulus magnitudes or representations of stimulus magni-
tudes. Thus we also claim that judgment in the RJM is rel-
ative and not absolute. Having a representation of the cate-
gory structure does not mean that there must be a mapping
between raw stimulus magnitudes or representations of stim-
ulus magnitudes and the labels assigned to each stimulus. In
the RJM there is a direct mapping or transformation between
the internal response scale and category labels (i.e., the cat-
egory structure), but there is no direct mapping between the
internal response scale and stimulus magnitudes. Stimulus
magnitudes only cause activation on the internal response
scale via the relative judgment process.
More generally, even when judgment is entirely relative, it
is still possible to learn something about the category struc-
ture. For example, consider the Low-Spread Condition in
Figure 1. Suppose you hear a stimulus and are told it is “1”.
Then suppose you hear the next stimulus which sounds much
louder and are told it is “2”. Then suppose you hear a third
stimulus which sounds only a little bit louder and are told it is
“3”. By now you know that “2” is much louder than “1” and
that “3” is only a little bit louder than “2”. You’ve already got
quite a good idea (better than just ordinal) about the stimulus
structure derived from only relative judgment. Learning this
structure doesn’t mean you have somehow created a direct
mapping between stimulus magnitudes and category labels.
With accurate relative judgment there could even be an accu-
rate (but scale-free) representation of the category structure.
RJM Fits to the Brown et al. (in
press) Experiment.
In fitting the RJM to Brown et al.’s (in press) experiment,
the model had three free parameters: α1 representing confu-
sion between the current and previous difference (αi = 0 for
all i > 2), σ representing noise in the mapping process, and λ
representing the size of stimulus difference equal to a single
(and arbitrary) internal response scale unit. The location of
criteria on the internal response scale x“1”−“2” and x“2”−“3”
were arbitrarily fixed at 0 and 1 (without loss of generality,
one may define the locations of the lower and upper bounds
for response “2” as 0 and 1 respectively). The locations of the
zero points z“1”, z“2”, and z“3” are not free parameters, but are
assumed to be optimally located and were adjusted to maxi-
mize accuracy. That is, for every step in the best fitting of α1,
σ, and λ to the data, z“1”, z“2”, and z“3” were adjusted to max-
imize accuracy (not fit to the data) in a nested maximization.
The zero points were different for each experimental condi-
tion because the zero points represent the category structure
and the structure varied between experimental conditions.
Figure 3 shows the best-fit of the RJM. Best fitting param-
eters were α1 = 0.197, σ = 0.137, and λ = 4.224. The RMSE
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is 0.066 and the greatest mismatch is 0.15, indicating a simi-
lar fit to that reported by Brown et al. (in press) for SAMBA
(0.059 and 0.12, respectively). Mispredictions occur because
the RJM is predicting accuracy that is too high for the lowest
stimulus in the Low-Spread Condition and the lowest stim-
ulus in the High-Spread Condition. However, for the cor-
responding stimuli in the mirror image conditions, the fit is
quite accurate (i.e., accuracy is higher for the highest stimu-
lus in the High-Spread Condition and the highest stimulus in
the Low-Spread Condition). (Parker, Murphy, & Schneider,
2002, present some evidence for asymmetry between High-
and Low-Spread Conditions in auditory intensity judgments,
though their gain control hypothesis does not explain the full
pattern here and would be harder to extend to nonprothetic
dimensions.)
The RJM achieves this fit with three free parameters,
though we would have considered relaxing the constraint
χ = 1.0 if necessary (see Stewart et al., 2005, for details).
In fitting SAMBA four parameters were varied, with other
values taken from fits to previous data sets (and presumably
these parameters would have been varied too if necessary).
Figure 4 shows the optimal locations of the zero points rel-
ative to the criteria in the RJM for the three experimental
conditions.
Judgment is Still Relative
Brown et al. (in press) argue that, generally, relative
judgment models cannot predict data from uneven-stimulus-
spacing designs. We offer the look-up table model as a coun-
terexample of a purely relative judgment model which does
account for data from uneven stimulus-spacing-designs.
Brown et al. (in press) argue that, specifically, the RJM
cannot account for data from uneven-stimulus-spacings de-
signs. Brown et al. (in press) present an extended RJM which
can fit the data. In this model there is a mapping between
feedback labels and (peripheral representations of) stimulus
magnitudes. Like Brown et al. (in press), we would not de-
scribe the model as “relative” because there is a consistent,
long-term mapping between stimulus magnitudes and feed-
back labels.
In our implementation there is no mapping between feed-
back labels and stimulus magnitudes. Instead, there is a map-
ping between feedback labels and the zero points on the in-
ternal response scale. This difference is crucial. Here, as
in Stewart et al. (2005), there is long-term representation of
the category structure. The locations of the zero points (and
of the criteria) represent the category structure and are thus
correlated with stimulus magnitudes. But the zero points are
ideal-observer values acquired from only stimulus difference
information. Zero points are not stimulus magnitudes. In-
formation about the mapping between stimulus magnitudes
and points on the internal response scale is assumed to be
unavailable or unused. That is, presentation of a stimulus
does not result directly in activation on the internal response
scale. Activation is via the relative judgment process only.
To illustrate this point, consider Experiment 2 from Stew-


















































Figure 3. Fits of the RJM to the data from Brown et al.’s (in press)















Figure 4. Optimal locations of criteria and zero points. x“1”−“2”
and x“2”−“3” were arbitrarily fixed at 0 and 1. Note locations of zero
points are set to maximize accuracy (reflecting their optimal nature)
and not fit to the data.
10 evenly spaced tones varying in frequency. On a small
number of trials participants were given misleading feed-
back. For example, the third highest stimulus might be given
the feedback label “4”. On the following trial, participants
were found to be systematically biased to respond in the di-
rection of the lie. Continuing the example, if the next stimu-
lus was the fourth highest, participants had an increased ten-
dency to overestimate the stimulus and respond “5” instead
of the correct answer “4”. This is exactly what the RJM pre-
dicts, because the misleading feedback will invoke the in-
correct zero point (in the example, z“4” instead of z“3”). In
terms of the look-up table account, the misleading feedback
will cause participants to map the stimulus difference onto
response categories using the wrong previous-feedback row
(in the example, the row for “4” instead of the row for “3”).
If judgment were absolute and the response scale directly ad-
dressable from stimulus magnitudes, this effect would not be
predicted. (See Brown et al., 2008, for an explanation us-
ing SAMBA, in which the mapping between magnitude es-
timates and response accumulators is completely re-adjusted
to accommodate the misleading feedback.)
Conclusion
We have shown that a relative model, the RJM, can ac-
count for data from experiments with uneven stimulus spac-
ing. The RJM is a relative model in the sense that the funda-
mental unit submitted for judgment is the difference between
the current stimulus and the last, rather than the position of
the stimulus in the experimental range (e.g., Marley & Cook,
1984) or on a continuum that is independent of the other
stimuli in the ensemble (e.g., Kent & Lamberts, 2005; Treis-
man, 1985). Just because a model is relative in this sense
does not mean that the participant is without any kind of
long-term knowledge of the category structure: Such knowl-
edge can be obtained from stimulus differences and verbal
feedback, without there being any direct association between
the sensation evoked by an individual, isolated stimulus and
the corresponding response label.
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